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Sales Growth of New Pharmaceuticals Across the Globe:  
The Role of Regulatory Regimes 
Abstract 
Prior marketing literature has overlooked the role of regulatory regimes in explaining 
international sales growth of new products. This paper addresses this gap in the context of new 
pharmaceuticals (15 new molecules in 34 countries) and sheds light on the effect regulatory regimes have 
on new drug sales across the globe.  
Based on a time-varying coefficient model, we find that differences in regulation substantially 
contribute to cross-country variation in sales. One of the regulatory constraints investigated, i.e. 
manufacturer price controls, has a positive effect on drug sales. The other forms of regulation such as 
restrictions of physician prescription budgets and the prohibition of direct-to-consumer advertising tend to 
hurt sales. The effect of manufacturer price controls is similar for newly launched and mature drugs. In 
contrast, regulations on physician prescription budget and direct-to-consumer advertising have a 
differential effect for newly launched and mature drugs. While the former hurts mature drugs more, the 
latter has a larger effect on newly launched drugs. In addition to these regulatory effects, we find that 
national culture, economic wealth, introduction timing, lagged sales and competition, also affect drug 
sales.   
Our findings may be used as input by managers for international launch and sales decisions. They 
may also be used by public policy administrators to compare drug sales in their country to other countries 
and to assess the role of regulatory regimes therein. 
 
Keywords: International new product growth, drug, pharmaceutical, regulation, culture, economics, time-
varying effects, penalized splines.   1
Introduction 
Over the last decades, marketing research on international new product growth has 
identified several key drivers of variation across countries. Among them, the most prominently 
studied are economic and socio-cultural characteristics of nations (Dekimpe et al. 1998, Gatignon 
et al. 1989, Helsen et al. 1993, Stremersch and Tellis 2004, Talukdar et al. 2002, Tellis et al. 
2003, Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). Cross-country interrelations have also received 
special attention, either under the umbrella of cross-national learning, lead-lag or introductory lag 
effects (see Dekimpe et al. 2000, for an extensive review). However, the role of regulation on 
new product growth has been mostly overlooked. 
This lack of research is particularly surprising as the variety of regulatory systems across 
the globe was among the prime motivations invoked for international new product growth models 
(Heeler and Hustad 1980, Mahajan and Muller 1994) and recent calls have been made for more 
research in this area (e.g. Stremersch and Tellis 2004). Government regulation is an interesting 
and complex object of study with many societal implications (Shugan 2003). Industries in which 
regulation affects firms’ marketing strategies and sales include telecommunications, energy, 
tobacco, liquor and financial services. Many countries have regulated the marketing of products 
in these industries, by means of advertising regulation for tobacco and financial services, price 
regulation for telecommunications and profit regulations for energy.  
In this paper, we focus on regulatory regimes in the pharmaceutical industry as there is 
increased evidence for its great influence, both from academia (Atun and Gurol-Urganci 2006, 
Berndt et al. 2005, Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005, Danzon and Ketcham 2003, Kyle 2007; 
Vakratsas and Kolsarici 2007) and practice (European Commission 2004; Urch 2005). Many 
different regulatory regimes exist and – while the business press routinely refers to their 
importance (e.g. The Economist 2007) – their effects on sales are not straightforward and largely   2
unexamined. Therefore, pharmaceuticals are an appropriate context to examine the role regulation 
may play in international sales growth.  
Our aim is to model market response to regulation in a non-stationary environment, the 
new product growth context. Therefore, we consider that regulatory regimes may have a 
differential effect on drugs that were introduced very recently (e.g. a few months ago) – we refer 
to such drugs as newly launched drugs – than on maturing drugs that have been on the market for 
a longer period of time. For instance, regulation that caps the number of prescriptions physicians 
can write may not influence sales of newly launched drugs that much, while it may seriously 
depress sales when the drug matures. As we will explain below, the reasons may be that, in the 
first months after launch, the volume the physician prescribes is still low and is predominantly 
used by the patients that benefit the most from the new drug, e.g. because alternative treatments 
for these patients were not effective or showed major side effects. Aside from regulation, prior 
research on international new product growth also contains some early evidence that other 
country characteristics, such as national culture and economic wealth affect new product growth 
differentially across the life cycle (e.g. Stremersch and Tellis 2004, Tellis et al. 2003). Hence, 
ignoring potential variation over time in the effects of country characteristics, such as regulation, 
national culture or economic wealth on sales may yield misleading or incomplete insights. 
To analyze cross-country variation in new drug sales, we obtained monthly sales data for 
15 new molecules,
1 across 4 therapeutic categories and 34 countries, during their first 84 months 
(7 years) after launch. To explain the observed international differences, we gather data from 
many other sources on regulation, culture, and economics. Our data includes many developing 
nations, in Eastern Europe, Africa, South America, and the Middle East. This provides us with a 
                                                      
1 A molecule is the active substance of a drug. As several competing brands contain the same molecule, we 
focus on the sales growth pattern of the molecule rather than these brands. This choice is consistent with 
the literature on new product growth that generally models sales or adoption of a product (e.g. TV), 
irrespective of the brand (e.g. Sony).   3
strong empirical basis, though constrained to the context of international sales growth of new 
pharmaceutical drugs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
effects of countries’ regulatory environments for pharmaceuticals in more detail. In the 
subsequent sections, we then present our data, the modeling framework employed and our results. 
Finally, we end with a discussion and suggestions for future research. 
The Effect of Regulation on Drug Sales  
It is difficult to parsimoniously conceptualize regulation. In this section, we examine 
several aspects of the regulatory environment that are salient to marketers. It concerns regulation 
on: (1) manufacturer price, (2) physician prescription budgets, (3) patient co-payment, (4) 
marketing efforts to physicians; and (5) direct-to-consumer advertising.  
Manufacturer Price Regulation 
While several studies have analyzed the impact of price regulation on launch delays of 
new drugs (Atun and Gurol-Urganci 2006, Danzon et al. 2005, Kyle 2007), there is – to the best 
of our knowledge – little evidence as to the effect of price regulation on sales growth of new 
drugs. Governments may exert price control in multiple ways. The most prominent one is to 
directly control the manufacturer price for drugs (manufacturer price control). Governments 
impose these price restrictions regardless of R&D and production expenses. For instance, many 
European countries (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal and Switzerland) have direct manufacturer price controls. Often, the manufacturer is 
required to provide clinical evidence of the cost effectiveness of a new drug (e.g. in quality-
adjusted-life-years (QALY) added to patients suffering from the disease
2). Based on these cost-
                                                      
2 QALY is a measure for the beneficial effects of a medical treatment. It is based on the number of life 
years added thanks to the medical treatment. Each year in perfect health is assigned a value of 1, while   4
effectiveness studies, the regulated manufacturer price of the new drug is set in a negotiation 
between the government and the manufacturer. This regulated price will be applied in the 
marketplace and reviewed periodically, either at the initiative of the regulator or at the 
manufacturer’s initiative (e.g. Urch 2005). Note that the regulator may compensate part of the 
losses incurred by the manufacturer when a regulated price is lower than the price that would 
have been set by the manufacturer otherwise. 
The aim of direct manufacturer price controls is to lower drug prices. Based on the 
average 1992 prices of a sample of about 400 drugs across 6 countries, Danzon and Chao (2000) 
have also shown that average prices of drugs are lower in countries with price controls than in 
countries without price controls. Wright (2004) has argued theoretically that the regulated price 
in such direct regulation is also below the price manufacturers would set when there would not be 
any price controls. Previous research has shown negative elasticities of sales to prices in 
pharmaceutical markets (Berndt et al. 2002, Danzon and Chao 2000), as physicians often take the 
cost of the treatment into account in their joint decision with the patient (e.g., Hart et al. 1997). 
Therefore, we expect price regulation to positively affect sales.  
However, such effect may be limited for newly launched molecules, as compared to 
maturing molecules. Inspiration for such expectation comes from prior literature that examined 
the link between price regulation and pricing patterns over the new drug’s life cycle. This 
literature has shown that prices fall faster when prices are regulated, than when prices are not 
regulated (Danzon and Chao 2000; Ekelund and Persson 2003).  
Interestingly, we also obtained anecdotal evidence for the pricing pattern we hypothesize 
above for a subset of the countries in our sample.
3 Figure 1 shows the typical pricing pattern, 
                                                                                                                                                              
death is assigned a value of 0. Each year in imperfect health (e.g. because of the loss of a limb, lack of 
mobility, etc.) is assigned a value between 0 and 1.  
3 We obtained anecdotal evidence on pricing and marketing efforts for all drugs in our sample, but for a 
limited set of countries – Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States – for which our data supplier had complete information.   5
together with 95% confidence bounds (see online appendix for computational details) of new 
drugs in three countries with price control (Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada) and three 
countries without price control (Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States), over the 
data window. The values on the Y-axis represent the average drug price pattern across all drugs in 
these five countries in the presence or absence of regulation, expressed in dollars per gram. 
Figure 1 shows that prices in countries with price regulation decrease faster than prices in 
countries without price regulation, reaching substantially lower levels for maturing drugs. The 
upward slope in the non-regulated countries is likely due to the inflation. 
 
Figure 1: The typical price pattern for new drugs in countries that do not regulate prices 
versus countries that regulate prices. 
For all the reasons posited above, we may expect that, while manufacturer price 
regulation may increase sales of maturing drugs, it would in turn have little or no effect on sales 
of recently introduced drugs.  
Regulation on Physician Prescription Budgets 
The most direct way in which regulators can intervene in pharmaceutical markets for 
prescription drugs is to limit the total number of prescriptions a physician can write. For instance, 
Germany in the early 90s introduced a collective budget for prescription drugs that was later 
reformed to physician-level prescription budgets. Physicians in Latvia are assigned a fixed budget   6
calculated on the number of patients in their practice. Assigning budgets to physicians for the 
total number of drugs prescribed restricts prescription drug sales. Thus, countries that impose 
such restrictions are likely to show lower drug sales than countries that do not. 
Typically, physicians adopt a stepwise approach in prescription (Prosser et al. 2003). 
They try familiar alternatives first, and only prescribe new drugs if the familiar alternatives fail or 
cause adverse effects. Prosser and Walley (2003) find that physicians typically prescribe newly 
introduced drugs to patients who do not undergo significant improvement in their (mostly severe) 
condition when using prior alternatives or who do not tolerate such alternatives because of side 
effects that occur. Therefore, the effect of prescription budget regulation on early sales of a newly 
launched drug may be limited. However, the total market potential for the drug may be smaller in 
the presence of prescription budget regulation. In regulated markets, physicians will feel more 
pressure not to prescribe the drug to patients with mostly mild symptoms or who tolerate 
traditional alternatives well, as compared to non-regulated markets. 
Patient Co-Payment Regulation 
In many countries, patients are required some form of co-payment for prescription drugs. 
For instance, Belgian patients typically pay only a small part of their prescription medicine (the 
rest is paid by a government institution) and the contribution they pay is set at the level of the 
individual drug (again taking into account QALY). Hungary has a similar system (although the 
co-payment amounts differ), but also adds patient income to the reimbursement level, with higher 
reimbursements (in many cases 100%) for the poor. In other countries, patients do not co-pay for 
drugs. For instance, in the Netherlands, the cost of prescription drugs and physician visits is 
directly settled between physician, pharmacist and the patient’s insurance company (which can be 
private or public). In co-payment systems, patients are monetarily sanctioned for drug use and 
thus experience a part of the cost of their treatment directly (Reuveni et al. 2002). Such monetary   7
sanctioning is expected to depress drug sales, given that it makes treatment cost a more salient 
criterion in the physician-patient joint decision (e.g. Hart et al. 1997).  
A policy initiative in Italy provides initial face validity for the above reasoning. Italy 
abolished its co-payment system at the end of 2000. In the first few months of 2001, 
pharmaceutical spending in Italy rose by anything up to 30% (while the federation of Italian 
family practitioners assessed the total increase to be around 2-3%). Soon after, co-payments were 
reintroduced by the Italian government (Urch 2005). Cross-country variation in drug sales, driven 
by the absence or presence of a co-payment system, has not been investigated upon such a large 
scale as in the present paper.  
There is no reason to expect the presence of a co-payment system to affect newly 
launched drugs differently than mature drugs, as the level of co-pay in countries may not depend 
on the drug’s age or, even, on the drug’s price. For example, in Austria, patients pay a flat fee of 
€ 4.45 per prescription. In Portugal, patients pay a fixed percentage of the drug cost according to 
the essential nature of the drug (specified at the category level).  
Regulation on Marketing Efforts to Physicians 
Marketing activities to physicians represent a large and growing part of the expenditures 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Mizik and Jacobson (2004) indicate that U.S. companies have 
spent over $5.8 billion in 2002 on detailing, combined with another $11.5 billion on free 
sampling. In view of these large costs, scholars have paid a lot of attention to the effects of 
marketing efforts to physicians on prescription behavior and pharmaceutical sales (Chintagunta 
and Desiraju 2005, Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999, Ding and Eliashberg 2008, Hahn et al. 1994, 
Leeflang et al. 2005, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2004, Manchanda and Honka 2005, 
Manchanda et al. 2004, Mantrala et al. 1994, Narayanan 2004, Narayanan et al. 2004, Narayanan 
et al. 2005). There has been some debate on the direction of the effect of marketing efforts on 
prescription behavior. Some authors find positive effects (e.g. Gönül et al. 2001), others find   8
neutral effects (e.g. Rosenthal et al. 2003), and still others find negative effects (e.g. Parsons and 
Vanden Abeele 1981). Also the size of these effects has been under debate; some find strong 
effects (e.g. Gönül et al. 2001), while others find more modest effects (e.g. Mizik and Jacobson 
2004). Nonetheless, the overall conclusion is that marketing efforts often have a positive and 
significant effect on physician decision making. Patients are typically not aware of this influence 
on the prescription decision. 
The marketing efforts that prior literature has considered are: detailing, meetings, and 
sampling (see, Narayanan and Manchanda 2006, Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). 
Regulation may constrain the number of detailing visits a manufacturer can make, the number of 
meetings a manufacturer can organize, or the number of samples a manufacturer can dispense to 
physicians. For instance, the amount manufacturers spend in the United Kingdom on sales 
promotions is limited to a proportion of their overall (not drug-specific) profits (the “marketing 
allowance”). In Spain, promotional costs are capped at a percentage of sales of the firm. Given 
the expected positive effect of marketing efforts on new drug sales, we expect that countries that 
limit the marketing efforts of a pharmaceutical firm to physicians would show lower drug sales 
than countries that do not impose such limits.  
One may counter that if the cap is quite high, it may not affect marketing efforts at all, 
and therefore not affect drug sales. However, this argument does not fit the regulatory practices of 
countries. First, the reason why governments implement these caps to marketing efforts is always 
to limit prescriptions (see Urch 2005). Second, just from the specific regulations, one can 
appreciate the low level at which marketing efforts are capped. For instance, in Poland, 
manufacturers can only drop, at maximum, 3 samples of the smallest package with a physician’s 
office over an entire year. Such approach contrasts sharply with the United States, where it is 
common to drop in the neighborhood of 10 samples with a physician’s office per year (source: 
IMS Health, category for anti-arthritic treatments (Cox-2)).    9
Anecdotal evidence we obtained for a subset of the countries confirms the negative 
influence of such regulation on marketing efforts. Similar to Figure 1, we report the typical 
pattern of marketing efforts for new drugs, together with 95% confidence bounds, in two 
countries with restrictions on marketing efforts (Belgium and the United Kingdom) and three 
countries without such restrictions (Germany, Switzerland and the United States) in Figure 2. The 
values on the Y-axis represent the average pattern in marketing efforts across all drugs in these 
five countries in the presence or absence of regulation, expressed in thousands of dollars. It shows 
that marketing efforts are lower in countries with restrictions on marketing efforts than in 
countries without such restrictions.  
 
Figure 2: The typical pattern in marketing efforts for new drugs in countries that do not 
restrict marketing efforts versus countries that restrict marketing efforts. 
In addition, one may expect that the restriction of marketing efforts to physicians has a 
larger effect for newly drugs than for maturing drugs. The literature on advertising has shown that 
the sales-to-advertising elasticity decreases over a product’s life cycle (Chandy et al. 2001; Tellis 
and Fornell 1988). The reason is that consumers are more motivated to process information about 
new products than older ones (Grunert 1996). The same very likely applies to physicians, as 
Neslin (2001) and Narayanan et al. (2005) show that detailing is the most effective in the 
introduction phase. In consequence, a regulatory restriction is likely to depress sales of newly   10
launched drugs more than sales of maturing drugs. A potential counterargument may be that firms 
could increase their marketing efforts to physicians as the drug matures. However, data on the 
pattern of communication efforts over time generally do not support this argument; rather, they 
support the contrary (for examples, see Horsky and Simon 1983; Lilien and Little 1976). In the 
pharmaceutical industry, Narayanan et al. (2005) show that market efforts to physicians for 
antihistamines increase for Allegra, decrease for Zyrtec and remain constant for Claritin. Also the 
anecdotal evidence in Figure 2 shows stable marketing efforts over time. 
Regulation on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) 
While regulating marketing efforts to physicians is a direct way to affect physicians’ 
prescription behavior, pharmaceutical firms can also attempt to influence patients by advertising 
the drug directly to consumers. So far, only two countries, New Zealand and the United States, 
allow pharmaceutical marketers to directly advertise to consumers. The practice is more novel 
than marketing efforts to physicians as it only became legal to directly advertise to consumers in 
the eighties in the United States and in the early nineties in New Zealand. Yet, the instrument is 
quickly becoming very popular among marketers. Spending on DTCA in the United States, for 
example, has increased from $1.1 billion in 1997 to $5.6 billion in 2006, according to IMS 
Health. 
Prior literature has shown that DTCA triggers patients – generally 10 to 44% of the 
people that viewed the ad – to request drugs by brand name from their physicians (Cohen 1988; 
Mehta and Purvis 2003; Mintzes et al. 2003; Rosenthal et al. 2003; Weissman et al. 2004; West 
1999; Wosinska 2002). Such patient requests are often accommodated by physicians, mainly 
because it affects physician visit satisfaction (Kravitz et al. 2003) and it shows patients that the 
physician cares (Schwartz et al. 1989). For instance, Bell et al. (1999) found that 46% of patients 
thought they would be disappointed if a physician did not prescribe an advertised drug they   11
requested, while 24% thought they might attempt to obtain the prescription from a different 
doctor and 15% thought they would switch to a new doctor. 
Given the expected positive effect of DTCA on drug sales, we expect that countries that 
forbid DTCA would show lower drug sales than countries, such as New Zealand and the United 
States, that do not impose such a restriction. We expect this effect to become smaller as a drug 
matures, for reasons similar to those developed on restrictions in marketing efforts to physicians. 
More precisely, we expect higher DTCA effectiveness for new drugs than for maturing drugs, in 
line with prior results by Neslin (2001) and consistent with the argument above regarding 
consumers’ higher motivation to process information about new products than old ones. 
Moreover, DTCA is generally high for newly launched drugs and declines as the drug matures 
(Rosenthal et al. 2002).  
Other Variables 
When examining the role of regulation in the context of new pharmaceuticals, we need to 
control for other factors that may explain cross-national variation in drug sales. Building our 
research on existing international new product growth literature, we subsequently consider the 
role of national culture (Stremersch and Tellis 2004, Tellis et al. 2003, Van den Bulte and 
Stremersch 2004), economics (Talukdar et al. 2002, Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004), 
introduction lag (Dekimpe et al. 2000, Kumar and Krishnan 2002, Talukdar et al. 2002), lagged 
sales (Desiraju et al. 2004) and competition (Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005, Desiraju et al. 2004) 
in the sales growth of new pharmaceuticals. 
National Culture 
Geert Hofstede
4 (Hofstede 1980 and 2001) identified four main dimensions of national 
culture that can be related to new drug sales: (1) uncertainty avoidance; (2) individualism; (3) 
                                                      
4 An alternative operationalization is Schwartz’s (1992) model of personal values. Hofstede’s national 
culture framework is the framework that is most often adopted by scientists, also in marketing. Early March   12
masculinity and (4) long term orientation.
5 Hofstede's national culture dimensions are widely 
accepted and frequently used for cross-country comparisons (e.g., Dawar and Parker 1994, Lynn 
et al. 1993, Roth 1995, Steenkamp et al. 1999). 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which the population of a country feels 
(intolerable) anxiety when facing uncertain or unknown situations (Hofstede 2001). Patients in 
uncertainty avoidant cultures show lower subjective health (Hofstede 2001). Lower subjective 
health perceptions may lead to higher demand for pharmaceutical drugs, considering that 
physicians typically accommodate patients’ requests for treatment (Bell et al. 1999). However, 
the positive effect of uncertainty avoidance on drug sales may only materialize towards maturing 
drugs, and have little or no effect on newly launched drugs. Indeed, new products are usually 
perceived as more risky, and their performance more ambiguous than established products and 
brands (Steenkamp et al. 1999). In cultures of high uncertainty avoidance, consumers are more 
likely to identify uncertainty in new products, compared to consumers in low uncertainty 
avoidance cultures (Michaut 2004). Moreover, societies high in uncertainty avoidance consider 
novel ideas as dangerous and are more intolerant toward change than societies low in uncertainty 
avoidance (Hofstede 1980). This may temper the positive effect of uncertainty avoidance on drug 
sales when it turns to newly launched drugs.  
Individualism describes the relationship between the individual and the collectivity that 
prevails in a given society and to what extent people prefer to act as individuals rather than as 
members of a social group (Hofstede 2001). Individualism may have several effects on drug 
sales. In general, individualist cultures tend to spend more of their public and private budgets on 
                                                                                                                                                              
2007, the top three cited references of Hofstede totaled 6,741 citations, while the top three works of 
Schwartz totaled only 1,035 citations (source: Google Scholar). Obviously, our work can easily be 
extended to test for the effects of Schwartz’s model of personal values, using the same methodology. 
5 We found neither theoretical support nor empirical evidence in our data to include power distance, the 
fifth Hofstede dimension, as explanatory variable. While power distance may very well be related to the 
structure of the health system (for instance, one may imagine medical doctors and pharmacists to take a 
more hierarchical position towards their patients in power distant cultures), there seems to be no argument 
to relate it to new drug sales.    13
health care (Hofstede 2001), which fits with the emphasis that individualist cultures put on 
individual well-being. In contrast, individual well-being in collectivist cultures is only relevant in 
relation to the collective well-being. Higher spending on health care will lead to higher drug 
sales. Patients in individualist societies also seek doctor consultation more actively than patients 
in collectivist societies, which, in turn also results in higher drug sales. While collectivist cultures 
have on average lower drug usage, the difference may be less pronounced for newly launched 
drugs. Indeed, as already stated above, newly launched drugs are typically prescribed to patients 
with a strong need for new therapeutical treatments, either because they did not undergo 
significant improvement in their condition when using prior alternatives or did not tolerate them 
because of side effects. Thus, differences in drug sales between collectivist and individualist 
cultures may be less apparent for newly launched drugs and only materialize for maturing drugs. 
Masculinity refers to the extent to which the value system, shared by the majority of the 
members of the middle class of a society, is characterized by male or female attributes (Hofstede 
1980). In masculine societies, males are supposed to be tough, while women are supposed to be 
tender. In feminine societies, both men and women are supposed to be tender (Hofstede 2001). 
Members of masculine societies, including patients and physicians, conceive the need for medical 
care as a weakness and a cause for shame when adhering to a masculine value system (Weber et 
al. 2000). In such societies, we can expect males to seek or receive medical treatment less than 
males in feminine societies.  
Long-term orientation opposes long-term to short-term aspects of Confucian thinking: 
persistence and thrift to personal stability and respect for tradition (Hofstede 2001). Persistence, 
perseverance and having a sense of shame are important values associated with a long-term 
orientation. Therefore, societies high in long-term orientation value typical Confucianist virtues, 
such as persevering, working hard, being patient and refraining from conspicuous consumption 
(Hofstede 2001). Members of societies high in long-term orientation may therefore refrain from 
drug therapy to treat certain ailments, such as high lipids or erectile dysfunction, but rather show   14
a different response to such ailments. A more acceptable decision for patients and physicians as a 
reaction to the cardiovascular risks of high lipids in countries high in long-term orientation may 
be changing food behaviors and exercising, rather than statin therapy. Also erectile dysfunction 
would be a cause for shame in many societies high in long-term orientation; one would accept not 
being able to have sex anymore more readily than in societies low in long-term orientation that 
are more focused on immediate gratification. Thus, sales of new drugs may be lower in countries 
high in long-term orientation than in countries low in long-term orientation.  
Economic Wealth 
Economic wealth has often been advanced as the major economic characteristic of 
nations that affects new product sales growth. The economic wealth of nations, most commonly 
operationalized by GDP per capita, may have several positive effects on sales of pharmaceuticals. 
On the one hand, the population of more wealthy countries can more easily afford drugs, than the 
population of less wealthy countries (Desiraju et al. 2004, Stremersch and Tellis 2004, Talukdar 
et al. 2002, Tellis et al. 2003, Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). On the other hand, economic 
wealth is also associated with better health infrastructure, which in turn may positively affect the 
sales of new drugs (Desiraju et al. 2004). In our view, these arguments are likely to play similarly 
for newly launched and maturing drugs. 
Cross-Country Introductory Lag 
Cross-country introduction delays refer to the time elapsed between the first introduction 
of a new product in any country of the world and its introduction in a focal country (Talukdar et 
al. 2002). The uptake of new molecules may be faster in laggard countries than in lead countries, 
because patients and physicians learn from experiences in lead countries (Dekimpe et al. 2000, 
Desiraju et al. 2004, Takada and Jain 1991). These cross-country “learning effects” have been 
found to generalize to multiple types of decision makers, including consumers, firms and   15
governments (Dekimpe et al. 2000). However, previous work also suggests that firms are likely to 
delay entry in countries that they judge “less attractive” than others. Factors influencing such a 
delay may be regulation (e.g. Kyle 2007) or expected sales. As such, introduction lag is not 
exogenous to our model. As further explained in the Model section, we solve this issue by using 
an instrumental variable procedure.  
Cross-country learning effects are likely to vary over time. The existence of cross-
country learning effects can be explained by the role they play in reducing the uncertainty 
associated with the adoption of new products. As new products are generally associated with 
more uncertainty than established products and brands (Steenkamp et al. 1999), we therefore 
expect that the role of cross-country learning effects will be more pronounced for newly launched 
than for maturing drugs. 
Competition 
The presence of competitive firms and brands has often been neglected in the previous 
new product growth literature, but is now largely recognized to be of major influence on new 
product sales (Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005, Mahajan et al. 1993, Mason 1990, see Chatterjee 
et al. 2000, for a review). To account for the role of word-of-mouth communication and the 
substitution dynamics between competing brands, Mahajan et al. (1993) proposed a diffusion 
modeling approach assessing the impact of competitive entry on market size and the sales of 
incumbent firms. Recently, Krishnan et al. (2000) found that the entry of a competing brand in the 
cellular telephone industry can affect the total market potential of the category and/or the speed of 
diffusion in the category, depending on the market studied. In the pharmaceutical industry, early 
evidence for the antidepressant category (Desiraju et al. 2004) suggests that competition may not 
have a strong influence. Given these mixed findings, it is hard to make expectations as to the 
direction of this effect, as well as to its variation over time.   16
Lagged Sales 
There are three reasons why lagged sales of a new drug may affect present sales of that drug. 
First, once a physician starts prescribing a new drug, he may trigger adoption also by other 
physicians, an effect commonly known as contagion. Second, physicians show considerable 
inertia in prescription behavior (Janakiraman et al. 2005; Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). 
Thus, physicians that heavily prescribe a certain drug today are likely to maintain a similar 
prescription behavior in the future. Third, in the case of chronic diseases, patients generally stay 
on the same drug for a longer time, receiving refill prescriptions repeatedly. All three effects will 
create duration dependence in sales, either coming from influence across physicians, persistence 
over time within a physician’s prescription behavior, or persistence over time within a patient’s 
treatment behavior. 
Contagion among physicians and inertia in the physicians’ prescription behaviors are 
typically phenomena that affect already established drugs, rather than newly launched drugs. 
Thus, we expect the effect of lagged sales to increase over the new drugs’ life cycle. 
We provide an overview of all our expectations in Table 1. In columns 2 and 3, we define 
the operationalization of the variables. In columns 4 and 5, we specify the effects expected for 
each covariate studied. In particular, column 4 specifies the main effect, while column 5 specifies 
how the effect is likely to change over time as the drug matures. We also include our empirical 
findings in columns 6 and 7 and assess whether our expectations are confirmed in the last 
column.   17
Table 1: Summary table of variable operationalization, expectations and empirical findings 
     
  Operationalization of the variable 
 
 
Expected effect on sales in kg 
per 1,000 inhabitants aged 15 
years and older 
Found effect on sales in kg 
per 1,000 inhabitants aged 
15 years and older 














Regulation             
Manufacturer Price  Existence of a direct control of the ex-
manufacturer price  
Time-varying +  +  +  N.s.  Partly 
Physician Prescription 
Budgets 
Existence of a restriction on the total number 
of prescriptions a physician can write 
Time-varying -  -  -  -  Yes 
Patient Co-Payment  Participation of the patient in the payment of 
prescription drugs 
Time-varying -  N.s.  N.s.  N.s.  Partly 
Marketing Efforts to 
Physicians 
Existence of a restriction on the number of 
detailing visits, meetings and samples  
Time-varying -  +  N.s.  N.s.  No 
Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising 
Prohibition of direct-to-consumer advertising  
by the government 
Time-varying -  +  -  +  Yes 
Other variables              
Uncertainty Avoidance  Extent to which members of a society attempt 
to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity 
Time-invariant +  +  N.s.  +  Partly 
Individualism  Degree to which individuals are expected to 
stand up for themselves and are integrated 
into groups 
Time-invariant   +  +  +  +  Yes 
Masculinity  Extent to which the value system, shared by 
the majority of the members of the middle 
class of a society, is characterized by male or 
female attributes 
Time-invariant   -  N.s. -  N.s.  Yes 
Long-Term Orientation  Describes a society's time horizon, or the 
importance attached to the future versus the 
past and present 
Time-invariant -  N.s. -  N.s.  Yes 
Economic Wealth  GDP per capita  Time-varying +  N.s.  +  N.s.  Yes 
Cross-Country Introductory 
Lag 
Number of months elapsed since the first 
introduction of the drug in any country 
Time-invariant +/-  -  N.s.  -  Partly 
Competition  Number of competitive molecules in the same 
ATC category of the drug in the country 
Time-varying +/-  +/-  -  -  Partly 
Lagged Sales  Sales of the drug in the country one period 
back 
Time-varying +  +  +  +  Yes   18
Data 
We studied the sales growth process of 15 new molecules in four categories that were 
launched over the period 02/1994 to 12/2004. The four categories (ATC Codes
6 in-between 
brackets) are: lipid modifying agents, more specifically statins (C10aa), urinary antispasmodics 
(G4bd), erectile dysfunction drugs (G4be), and (other) antihistamines for systematic use (R6ax). 
We selected these categories for several reasons. First, these drug categories represent a 
substantial portion of the total pharmaceutical market in dollar sales (around 10%). Second, they 
are typically prescribed by general practitioners, rather than administered in a hospital (e.g. 
oncology). In the drug categories we study, retail sales represent more than 98% of the total 
volume, the remaining sales being made through the ‘in-patient’ hospital channel and direct 
government purchases. Third, these drug categories contain a sufficient number of new drugs that 
entered after the start of the observation window, which is fixed to 02/1994 because of data 
handling procedures of IMS Health. We consider the sales growth process across 34 countries 
that span the globe (see Figure 3 below), including both developed and developing countries. 
The country-level sales data consists of quantity sold in grams in retail, per 1,000 
inhabitants aged 15 years and above. Such normalization corrects for country size, as advocated 
by Dekimpe et al. (1998), and also accounts for the fact that the drugs considered are mainly 
designed for the adult population. This correction is particularly relevant as we consider together 
developed and developing countries for which the age distribution may strongly differ.
7 Fifteen 
years and above is a typical cut-off in international statistics, such as the UN or OECD, and is 
used by other scholars in the context of international pharmaceutical markets (Lanjouw 2005). 
We obtained the sales data from IMS Health for each molecule from its market introduction, with 
the maximum number of months for drug-country combinations being 84 months. Census data 
                                                      
6 More information on the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) codes can be found on the official 
website of the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology: http://www.whocc.no/atcddd/. 
7 We thank one of the reviewers for this insight.   19
are gathered from the United Nations Statistical Division website. Table 2 provides an overview 
of therapeutic categories, their molecules with commercial brand names (one molecule can be 
sold under different brand names and by different companies), and the period in which the 
molecule was launched for the first time.  
The healthcare regulatory data includes annual data from multiple sources.  The first 
source is URCH Publishing. URCH Publishing is an independent information provider for the 
biotechnological, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries. The second source is the OECD, 
which publishes reports on health regulation among its member states (e.g. Jacobzone 2000). The 
third source includes local health officials and ministries of health, contacted individually. 
We operationalize regulation through five dummy variables. The first dummy variable 
(manufacturer price regulation) takes the value 1 if the government directly controls the 
manufacturer price for drugs, 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable (regulation on marketing 
efforts to physicians) takes the value 1 if the government has regulated the number of detailing 
visits a manufacturer can make, the number of meetings a manufacturer can organize, or the 
number of samples a manufacturer can dispense to physicians, 0 otherwise. 
ATC 
code 
Molecule  Brands  Time of first 
introduction 
C10aa Atorvastatin  Lipitor  1/1/1997 
 Cerivastatin
8 Baycol,  Lipobay 4/1/1997 
 Fluvastatin  Lescol  2/1/1994 
 Rosuvastatin  Crestor  2/1/2003 
G4bd Solifenacin  Visicare  9/1/2004 
 Tolterodine  Detrol  11/1/1997 
G4be Alprostadil  Caverject, Muse, Viridal   3/1/1994 
 Apomorphine  Uprima,  Ixense  6/1/2001 
  Sildenafil  Viagra, Revatio, Caverta  1/1/1998 
 Tadalafil  Cialis  1/1/2003 
 Vardenafil  Levitra  3/1/2003 
R6ax Desloratadine  Clarinex  1/1/2001 
 Epinastine  Elestat  6/1/1994 
 Fexofenadine  Allegra,  Telfast  8/1/1996 
 Mizolastine  Mizollen  1/1/1998 
Table 2: Our sample of pharmaceutical drugs  
                                                      
8 Note that Cerivastatin was withdrawn from the market in 2001. We only include sales data of this 
molecule until the withdrawal announcement to avoid a structural break in the sales data.   20
The third dummy variable (regulation on physician prescription budgets) takes the value 
1 if regulation restricts the prescriptions a physician can write, 0 otherwise. The fourth dummy 
variable (patient co-payment regulation) takes the value 1 if patients are required some form of 
co-payment for prescription drugs, 0 otherwise. The fifth dummy variable (regulation on direct-
to-consumer advertising) takes the value 1 if direct-to-consumer advertising is prohibited, 0 when 
it is allowed. 
While the regulatory environment is intrinsically more complex than the presence or 
absence of a restriction, it is hard to obtain more detailed information on the national peculiarities 
for each of the regulatory variables, and to code them in a sound and economical manner. 
Therefore, other scholars have also resorted to a dummy coding, in a manner similar to ours (Kyle 
2007). Yet the combination of these five regulatory dimensions still offers us 2
5, or 32 possible 
regulatory frameworks, of which 13 actually occur in practice. We also find quite a significant 
cross-national diversity in terms of each of the regulatory variables. For instance, about 65% of 
the countries have manufacturer price regulation; 16% regulate the marketing efforts to 
physicians; 37% limit physicians’ prescription budgets; 75% apply a patient co-payment system; 
and 96% prohibit direct-to-consumer advertising. 
As readers may be relatively unfamiliar with countries’ regulation profiles, Figure 3 
summarizes all regulation dummies in a composite regulation score (from “no regulation” (on all 
of the above five aspects), to “fully regulated” (on all of the above five aspects)), on which we 
position each of the countries. The interior points are determined by the number of regulatory 
restrictions in effect. This ranking has no other ambition than illustrating the intensity of the 
national regulatory regimes to the reader and, for simplicity, makes no qualitative distinction 
between the various regulatory aspects.
9 The position of countries may change, if they made 
                                                      
9 While our model in the results section includes dummies for each of the five different regulations, we are 
not able to disclose them at the individual country level because this data is, in part, proprietary. For more 
detail on each country’s regulatory environment, we refer readers to Urch, which publishes many   21
regulatory changes in the data window. A hyphen following the year means “as of that year”, 
while a hyphen preceding the year means “before that year”. Note however that changes in 
regulation are quite rare in our data window. Only 17% of the countries included made a 
regulatory change during the time frame.  
For cultural characteristics of countries, we use Hofstede’s (2001) values on four 
cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and long-term orientation. 
Hofstede’s values have been shown to be very robust indicators of national culture (Steenkamp et 
al. 1999, Tellis et al. 2003). Given the relatively high number of missing values in the long-term 
orientation dimension, we proceed to the imputation of missing values using the multiple 
imputation method for continuous data proposed by Schafer (1997, 2002). This method has been 
recently advocated and used in a similar context by Deleersnyder et al. (2008). 




Brazil  Argentina, Chile,         
Denmark (1997-),        
Ecuador,  
Estonia, 
Israel (-1998)            
Lithuania,  
South Africa (-2004).     
Austria (1999-),  
Australia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark (-1997),  
Finland, Germany,        
Israel (1998-),  
Italy (-1996), 
Latvia, Luxembourg,      
Mexico (1996-),        
The Netherlands (-1996),  
Norway,  Poland (-2002),    
Portugal, Slovakia,   
South Africa (2004-),       
Sweden, Turkey. 
Austria (-1999)         
Greece,  
Hungary,        




The Netherlands (1996-), 
Poland (2002-),         
Spain,  




Figure 3: Countries from no regulation to fully regulated 
Quarterly GDP per capita is used as a measure of economic wealth, obtained by dividing 
production-based GDP data from Thomson DataStream at current prices, converted to U.S. 
dollars, without seasonal adjustment, by United Nations mid-year population data for all 34 
countries involved. The introductory lag effect for drug i in country j at time t is operationalized 
as the number of months elapsed since the first introduction of drug i in any country. This 
                                                                                                                                                              
regulatory reports on international pharmaceutical markets at a relatively low price, and the OECD, which 
publishes reports on the pharmaceutical regulation of its member states. The regulatory information we 
gathered ourselves for countries not covered by Urch or OECD can be obtained from the authors upon 
request.   22
variable is time-invariant. The effect of competition for drug i in country j at time t is 
operationalized as the number of competitive molecules that belong to the same ATC category 
and that are present/sold in country j at time t. To have a complete picture of the market 
conditions, we also include the molecules introduced before 1994 and that belong to the same 
ATC category. This variable is time-varying. Finally, lagged sales for drug i in country j at time t 
is operationalized as the sales of the same drug i in the same country j in t-1. 
To conclude, note that the tests we conducted (variance inflation factors, condition 
indices) did not detect severe multicollinearity. 
Model Specification 
Let icjt y  be the monthly grams per thousand inhabitants aged 15 years and above of drug i 
belonging to the drug category (ATC) c sold in country j at time t , with  icj T t ,..., 1 = , where  icj T  
is the number of sample points for drug i from category c in country j. All categories that we 
consider are available in every country. We specify a nested structure in which each drug i is 
nested in a particular drug category c. By doing so, we allow for higher correlation among sales 
of drugs belonging to the same ATC. For all drugs, we have  0 = icjt y  up to t = 0. We model  icjt y  
using the following time-varying coefficient model: 
icjt icj t icjt t icjt t jt t
j t j t j t j t
jt t jt t jt t jt t jt t icjt
IL y COMP GDP
LTO MAS IND UA
DTCA COPAY BUDG PROM PRICE y
η β β β β
β β β β
β β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
− 13 1 12 11 10
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1
   
with  icjt ic c icjt ε γ α η + + = ,  ( )
2
0, ~ α σ α α N c , ( )
2 , 0 ~ γ σ γ N ic  and  ( )
2 , 0 ~ t icjt N σ ε ,         (1) 
where the  pt β  , p = 1, …, 13, are the smoothly time-varying effects of the covariates under 
investigation. This model allows us to disentangle the effect of each country characteristic on new 
drug sales from its market introduction until 84 months after introduction. Upon a preliminary visual   23
inspection of the residuals, we allow the error term to be heteroskedastic with  t t
2 2 σ σ = .
10 In the 
above equation,  jt PRICE  indicates whether the manufacturer price is regulated (=1) or not (=0) in 
country j in month t,  jt PROM  specifies whether marketing efforts to physicians are regulated (=1) 
or not (=0) in country j in month t,  jt BUDG denotes whether regulation limits physicians’ 
prescription budgets (=1) or not (=0) in country j in month t,  jt COPAY  indicates whether a co-
payment system is applied (=1) or not (=0) in country j in month t, and  jt DTCA  stands for the 
interdiction of direct-to-consumer advertising (=1) or its acceptance (=0). In turn,  j UA ,  j IND , 
j MAS  and  j LTO  represent respectively the time-invariant uncertainty avoidance, individualism 
score, masculinity and long-term orientation scores of country j,
11 while  jt GDP  is the GDP per 
capita in country j in month t. The competition variable  icjt COMP  represents the number of 
competitive molecules that belong to the same ATC category as drug i and that are sold in country j at 
time t. The lagged sales variable  1 − icjt y  represents the sales of the same drug in the same country in t-
1. Finally, the introductory lag variable  icj IL  indicates the number of months elapsed since the first 
introduction of drug i in any country of the world and its introduction in country j. The superscripted 
bars indicate that variables are standardized (i.e. zero mean, unit variance) across countries and drugs 
in order to make the effects comparable to each other.  
                                                      
10 The specification of heteroskedastic errors yields a better fit (LL= -27002; BIC= 54304) than the 
specification of homoskedastic errors (LL= -27226; BIC= 54752).   
11 Note that the cultural variables are time-invariant. As noted by Steenkamp et al. (1999), a country's 
culture is a key environmental characteristic underlying systematic differences in consumer behavior 
(Triandis 1989). Culture is by nature stable over time and is not supposed to change in the short or medium 
run.   24
We also account for heterogeneity across drug categories by including a category-specific 
intercept  c α  and we specify the nesting structure among drugs within the same category by 
including  ic γ . The role of the category- and drug-specific intercepts are to capture a large part of 
the variation in sales due to the molecules’ idiosyncrasies, like e.g. drug indication, marketing 
instruments used or drug compliance (Bowman et al. 2004). Alternatively, one could have made 
the time-varying covariate effects    ...,   , 13 1 t t β β drug-specific, but such a specification would 
exhaust the degrees of freedom and lead to an over-parameterization of the model. 
We model the time-varying coefficients    ...,   ,   13 1 t t β β  in equation (1) using regression 
splines, which can be seen as a compromise between linear regression and nonparametric 
regression models. This class of models is also called conditionally parametric models because 
the time-varying parameters are nonparametric functions whereas the model is parametric for a 
specified t. More specifically, we opt for a penalized splines approach, introduced as P-spline 
smoothing in Eilers and Marx (1996). Penalized splines build upon recent developments in 
semiparametric modeling (for an overview of semiparametric models in marketing, see Van 
Heerde 2000) and has been increasingly advocated and used in statistics journals and books (see 
e.g. Chiang et al. 2001, Huang et al. 2002, Kauermann 2005, Wu and Zhang 2006).  
The advantage of splines compared to the specification of a linear, quadratic or even 
cubic trend lies in the fact that it does not impose any assumption (linear, quadratic or cubic) as to 
the interaction of the explanatory variables with time. It constitutes a highly flexible and modular 
approach by which the time-varying parameters can follow any pattern (Coull et al. 2001, 
Ruppert et al. 2003), at a low cost in terms of degrees of freedom. Such flexibility is important, 
given the novelty and the complexity of the research problem, which makes our hypotheses 
somewhat exploratory. Moreover, some variables may show discontinuities, which suit the 
semiparametric approach. For instance, the cross-country introduction lag may show 
discontinuities because of a lack of infrastructure in some lagging countries. We compare our   25
results with the estimates from a fully parametric model in the discussion section and find them to 
lead to very similar findings. 
Other estimation methods can be used such as penalized least squares (Hastie and 
Tibshirani 1993) or local plane fitting (Cleveland et al 1991). Time-varying coefficient models 
can also be estimated in a bayesian dynamic linear model framework (Neelamegham and 
Chintagunta 2004, Van Heerde et al. 2004) and/or using Kalman filter (Naik et al. 1998, West et 
al. 1985, West and Harrison 1997). To account for the dynamic effect of past values of the 
explanatory variables on sales, as it is the case with dynamic linear models, we include a lagged 
dependent variable term in equation (1). 
The general idea behind splines is that any smoothly varying function can be seen as a 
linear combination of basis functions. The latter can be polynomial functions of low degree (e.g. 
linear in case of linear splines, cubic in case of cubic splines). Hence, we can write the time-
varying coefficients as 
() 13 ,..., 1 ,
1
1 , 0 , = − + + = ∑
=
+ p t u t
K
k
k k p p pt
p κ β β β
β     (2) 
with() + − k t κ ,  , ,..., 1 K k =  a set of K linear spline basis functions,
12 which are in this case 
truncated lines with  k κ  the truncation point or knot (i.e. the location where the broken lines are 
tied together). Such combination of the linear splines basis functions  ( )( ) + + − − K t t t κ κ , , , , 1 1 K  
gives a piecewise linear function, called spline (see Wedel and Leeflang 1998, for an application 
of splines in marketing), with K distinct knots at  K κ κ ,..., 1  chosen in the range of t, in our case 
between t = 1 and t = 84 months. Alternatively, one could specify quadratic or cubic splines 
                                                      
12 This notation is standard in the statistical literature and indicates that the function equals zero for the 
values of t where () + − k t κ is negative.   26
(Sloot et al. 2006) using  ()( )
2 2
1




3 2 , , , , , , 1 + + − − K t t t t t κ κ K for cubic splines.  
As we have no prior on the location (on the time axis) where changes in the effect of the 
explicative variables may occur, we distribute the knots evenly over the complete time period and 
make sure that we have enough knots to cover the time range. As explained by Sloot et al. (2006), 
the number of knots should be chosen relative to the number of available observations. While a 
few knots may result in a model that is too restrictive, too many knots may result in estimation 





β  coefficients can be interpreted as weights to each of the basis functions that 
constrain their relative influence. These weights are penalized, i.e. they are subject to the 






2 β , for some constants  p U , p = 1, …,13. This penalty induces 
smoothness in the time-varying effects, preventing fits that are too rough or too wiggly.
14 
Previous research has shown that the model defined by equations (1)-(2), subject to 
aforementioned constraints, yields fitted values equivalent to those produced by a linear mixed 
model estimated (e.g. Verbeke and Molenberghs 2000), where the intercepts and slopes 
1 , 0 ,   and   p p β β  in equation (2) are estimated as fixed components and the 
p
k u
β    coefficients are 
taken as random components with respective variances Var(
p
k u
β ) = 
2
p β σ , p = 1, …,13 (Brumback 
et al. 1999, Coull et al. 2001, Ruppert et al. 2003). Therefore, the level of smoothing of the time-
varying effects is given by 
2 2
p t β σ σ . A higher 
2
p β σ corresponds to a more wiggly function, while 
                                                      
13 Our results turn out to be highly robust to the number and location of knots. In particular, sensitivity 
checks for 0 ≤ K ≤ 14 (see Ruppert et al. 2003) yield very similar findings. When K = 0, we obtain a linear 
trend model, which also yields similar fit and conclusions than the model reported in the results section. 
These results are available from the authors upon request. 
14 This penalization offers the optimal degree of smoothing given the number of knots available. 
Coefficients are shrunk towards zero. It avoids the resulting spline to interpolate the data points (overfitting 
or undersmoothing), which would be overly sensitive to measurement errors.   27
a smaller 
2
p β σ corresponds to more smoothness. The level of smoothing is determined by residual 
maximum likelihood (REML) as demonstrated in Wand (2003), rather than using Akaike’s 
information criterion or cross-validation methods. As noted by Opsomer et al. (2001), smoothing 
parameter selection with any data-driven method typically leads to serious overfitting in case of 
correlated errors. With linear mixed models however, once the correlation structure is specified, 
estimation of regression parameters can be carried out without computationally-intensive cross-
validation procedures (Kauermann and Komski 2006, Krivobokova et al. 2006). Linear mixed 
models are very easy to estimate in standard statistical software (e.g. PROC MIXED in SAS or 
lme in S-PLUS and R). In addition, the mixed model framework permits the use of likelihood 
ratio tests for model selection and theory testing. More details can be found in Crainiceanu et al. 
(2005) or Ruppert et al. (2003). 
Instrumenting for Launch Delay  
We deal with the potential endogeneity of the introductory lag variable  icj IL  in a similar 
fashion as Desiraju et al. (2004). We find a set of exogenous instruments, denoted by icj Z , that are 
correlated with the endogenous variable  icj IL  but uncorrelated with the residuals  icjt ε , and that 
have an effect on yicjt only through  icj IL . As they explained, the underlying idea is to “use 
variation in  icj IL  that is explained by the exogenous variables for estimation” as all other 
unexplained variation is possibly correlated with the residuals. The approach is similar in spirit to 
two-stage least squares. 
In addition to the exogenous variables depicted in equation (1), we consider as instrument 
for  icj IL  the introductory lag of all other drugs in the same ATC c (but drug i) in country j. This 
choice is justified by the idea that the introductory lag of the other drugs that belong to the same 
ATC class c as drug i in a particular country j is a reasonable predictor of the introductory lag of 
the focal drug in that country. Indeed, we expect that managers’ launch decisions would be   28
affected by similar underlying factors for all drugs in a given ATC, such as the country’s 
population size or their sales expectations. Moreover, this variable is uncorrelated with the 
residuals  icjt ε  as confirmed by the high p-value obtained from the Durbin-Wu-Haussman test for 
endogeneity (p= 0.95). 
Formally, we define the introductory lag of other drugs in the same ATC (but drug i) in 
country j as  cj i z , − the mean value of  icj IL for all drugs (except the focal drug i) in that particular 
country j. We construct the instrument as the predicted value from a regression of the endogenous 
variable  icj IL  on the entire set of exogenous variables in equation (1) including  cj i z , − , next 
denoted as Zicj. Thus, the first stage consists of: 
icj icj ic c icj Z IL ω λ τ δ + + + =       ( 3 )  
with ic c τ δ   and    the category- and drug-specific intercepts and  ( )
2 , 0 ~ ω σ ω N icj . As such, we ensure 
that  icj Z and  icjt ε are uncorrelated by construction. The second stage then consists of using in 
equation (1), the predicted value for  icj IL  given by estimating equation (3) instead of the 
endogenous variable  icj IL . Standard errors are corrected using the results offered by Murphy and 
Topel (1985). 
Results 
This section presents the estimation results of the model described in the previous 
section. We first discuss results from the instrumental variable procedure described earlier. We 
then turn to a fit comparison of various specifications (after correcting for endogeneity) and 
comment on the parameter estimates of the best model. 
Instrumental Variable Procedure 
The regression of  icj IL  on  icj Z  in equation (3) provides an approximate adjusted R
2 = 
0.46 and the regression of  icj IL on the instrument  cj i z , − alone gives an approximate adjusted R
2 =   29
0.40, indicating that our instrument predicts the endogenous variable reasonably well. To further 
assess whether the instrumental variable procedure works properly, we compare the estimated 
effect of the introductory lag when the instruments are used or not. We find that, when using 
instruments instead of the endogenous variable, the estimated effect of the introductory lag 
variable is on average 29% higher over the whole time window (-0.017 instead of -0.025). This 
result is consistent with our expectations. Recall that managers are expected to make launch 
decisions to maximize future sales and tend to launch first in countries where they expect higher 
sales. Thus, an increase in the value of  icjt ε would lead to an earlier introduction, i.e. a smaller 
introductory lag, meaning that we should have a negative correlation between  icjt ε  and  icj IL . 
Therefore, if the endogeneity problem remains uncorrected, we would expect the estimated effect 
for  icj IL to be biased downwards, which is consistent with our results.  
Model Fit Comparisons 
In Table 3, we evaluate the model fit with respect to alternate specifications, that is: (1) 
whether to allow parameters to vary over time (none, all or some of them); (2) whether to specify 
linear, quadratic or cubic spline functions; and (3) whether to include regulatory predictor 
variables or not. The fourth column of Table 3 reports the number of parameters for the various 
specifications.
15 
We start our estimation procedure by estimating equation (1)-(2), allowing all effects to 
vary over time. Our results indicate that this improves model fit. However, when letting all 
parameters to be time-varying, some of the slope parameters 1 , p β  in equation (2) turn to be 
insignificant. Therefore, we also estimate a variant of the model in equation (1) with both time-
varying and time-invariant effects (i.e. those having a non-significant slope above). The latter gets 
                                                      
15 For instance, the time-invariant model includes 16 parameters: the effect for each of the 13 explanatory 
variables, as well as  0 α , 
2
α σ  and
2
γ σ  . In turn, the time-varying model includes 26 additional parameters 
as we now add 2 extra parameters for each of the 13 explanatory variables. The derivation of the number of 
parameters for the other specifications is pretty straightforward.    30
a better Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) than a model with time-varying effects only. This 
result provides evidence that some of the explanatory variables, i.e. physician prescription 
budgets regulation, direct-to-consumer advertising regulation, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, introductory lag, competition and lagged sales, have a differential impact on the 
sales of newly launched drugs than on maturing drugs. The other variables appear to have a 
constant effect over the (observed part of the) product life cycle of new drugs. We present the 
parameters of this model in Table 4 (time-invariant effects) and Figure 4 (time-varying effects). 
Our results also indicate that the specification of quadratic or cubic spline functions does 
not yield a better fit than linear splines, when accounting for the additional number of parameters 
such specifications generate. 
Finally, the last line of Table 3 provides the fit measures for this model, but excluding the 
regulatory variables. Such model yields a substantially lower log-likelihood and a much higher 
BIC, demonstrating that regulatory differences across countries do considerably improve the 
model fit. In other words, they provide a valuable and substantive explanation as to the cross-
national differences in drug sales. 
To evaluate the overall fit of the model, we also calculated an approximate adjusted R
2-
measure of the best model, which turns to be is highly satisfactory (adjusted R
2 = 0.93).  





Parameters  Max LL  BIC 
Time invariant  -  included  16  -27121  54402 
Time-varying linear  spline  included  42  -26982  54383 
Linear spline  included  30  -27002  54304 
quadratic spline  included  37  -26992  54354 
cubic spline  included  44  -26977  54392 
Both time-varying and invariant 
linear spline  excluded  21  -32317  64843 
Table 3: A linear splines model with both time-varying and time-invariant effects, including 
regulatory variables fits the data best.   31
Parameter Estimates 
As our model estimates both time-varying and time-invariant parameters, we depict the 
time-invariant effects in Table 4 and plot the time-varying parameter estimates, with their 95% 
confidence bounds in Figure 4 (All results are available in the online appendix).  
Time-Invariant Effects  Value  Standard Error 
Manufacturer price regulation  0.076  0.010 *** 
Marketing efforts to physicians regulation  -0.019  0.016 
Patient co-payment regulation  -0.050  0.037 
Masculinity   -0.047  0.006 *** 
Long-term orientation  -0.018  0.012 * 
Economic wealth  0.024  0.007 *** 
BIC = 54304; n = 21486     
*p<0.100; **p<0.050; ***p<0.010    
Table 4: Time-invariant coefficients and their respective standard errors. 
We sequentially discuss the effect of (i) regulation, (ii) culture, (iii) economic wealth, (iv) 
competition, (v) lagged sales and (vi) introductory lag. Our main findings are in line with the 
theoretical expectations, summarized in Table 1.  
Regarding the role of regulation, each of the regulatory variables, except the regulation 
on marketing efforts to physicians and patient co-payment, is found to have a significant impact 
on drug sales. In particular, drug sales tend to be higher in countries with manufacturer price 
controls, than in countries without price controls. While price regulation can cause launch delays 
(Kyle 2007), it apparently does not constrain drug availability to patients once launched; in fact, 
we find quite the opposite. However, in contrast to our expectation, we cannot provide strong 
evidence for any variation over time in the effect of manufacturer price regulation on drug sales. 
One possible reason why we do not find strong evidence for time variation in this effect may be 
that prices change rather smoothly over time and thus, may be captured in the diffusion effects 
(Bass et al. 1994), even if the price in countries with price regulation decreases more than in 
countries without price regulation. Another possible reason may be the collinearity generated by 
the inclusion of the interaction between price regulation and time, leading to conservative 
significance levels.     32
 
Figure 4: Time-varying effects of the explanatory variables on new drug sales, with 95% 
confidence bounds
16 
                                                      
16 These confidence bounds are obtained by adding and subtracting twice the estimated standard error of the 
estimated function (time-varying coefficients; see Ngo and Wand 2004). They can be interpreted as 
approximate pointwise confidence intervals. In the linear mixed model framework, we derive the standard 
errors as done in Coull et al. (2001).   33
In contrast, the other forms of regulation show a negative effect on drug sales. In 
particular, regulation on physician prescription budgets has a negative effect on drug sales. 
However, such regulation appears to be more effective for mature drugs while it has little or no 
impact on newly launched molecules. This result can be explained by the stepwise prescription 
behavior of physicians. 
While regulating marketing efforts of pharmaceutical firms to physicians tends to have a 
negative, although non-significant effect, the impact of direct-to-consumer advertising has a 
highly significant negative effect on new drug sales. This effect appears to be more pronounced 
for newly launched drugs than for maturing ones. In particular, we find this effect to be the most 
pronounced around one year after a new drug is introduced.  
Co-payment regulation turns out to have a negative and constant effect, although not 
significant at the 10% probability level, on drug sales which supports the idea that patients are 
monetarily penalized for drug usage in co-payment systems. The insignificant effect is likely due 
to the fact that the presence or absence of such regulation is a rough indicator, compared to the 
wide variation that exists in co-payment levels. 
As to the role of national culture, two of the cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance 
and individualism, tend to have a differential impact on newly launched vs. maturing drugs. In 
particular, we find that drug sales are higher, although non-significant at the 10% probability 
level, in countries with high uncertainty avoidance than in countries with low uncertainty 
avoidance. This finding can be related to the lower subjective health of inhabitants of uncertainty 
avoidant nations (Hofstede 2001). It interestingly complements previous research on international 
diffusion as uncertainty avoidance has been usually found to temper sales growth of new 
durables. The non-significance of the parameter suggests that the latter effect may actually still 
play a role, in particular for recently launched drugs for which we find no effect at all. This may 
result from the relatively higher perceived risk associated with adopting very new drugs.   34
However, when time passes, this effect is gradually overwhelmed by the effect of uncertainty 
avoidance on subjective health.  
In addition, we also find that new drug sales are higher in individualist countries than in 
collectivist countries, which confirms that the former may spend more of their budgets on drugs 
(as we control for GDP in the estimation) and may seek doctor consultation more actively. 
However, we also find that this difference is more pronounced for maturing drugs than for newly 
launched ones. This result can be explained by the stepwise prescription behavior of physicians. 
Furthermore, our results also indicate that new drug sales are lower in masculine 
countries than in feminine countries, which corroborates our expectations that drug intake by 
males would be considered a weakness in masculine societies. Given that this argument holds for 
both new and maturing drugs, we find this effect to be constant over time.  
Long-term orientation is found to have a negative, significant, and constant effect on drug 
sales which supports our hypothesis that patients and physicians in societies high in long-term 
orientation refrain from classical drug therapy. 
Economic wealth, in turn, positively affects new drug sales, which can be related to the 
fact that wealthier countries have better developed health infrastructure and can afford more 
easily new drugs than less wealthy countries. As to the effect of competition on new drug sales, 
we find little negative impact of the number of competitive molecules available in the market. 
However, this effect turns non-significant for recently introduced molecules. Our results 
corroborate the findings of Desiraju et al. (2004) for the antidepressant drug category. We do not 
find evidence that competition among molecules in the same ATC class expands the category. 
Lagged sales have a significant, positive and increasing effect on sales, which points to the inertia 
in the physicians’ prescription behavior as to the contagion among physicians and patients. 
Finally, the effect of the introductory lag (when using the instrument) turns to be non-significant 
at the 5% probability level, as it is also the case in the global diffusion study of Dekimpe et al. 
(1998). In line with our expectation, this effect, although non-significant, is the more pronounced   35
for recently introduced drugs. Note that the pattern of variation over time of this effect nicely 
illustrates the potential of P-splines in modeling discontinuous phenomena.  
To assess the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our model with alternate 
specifications as to the coding of the regulatory variables, the number and the location of knots 
for the time-varying effects, and the inclusion of interaction effects between the regulatory 
variables and the ATC categories as well as the lagged sales. Our results turn out to be hardly 






This section first discusses the implications our findings have for public policy and 
managers, after which it turns to the study’s limitations and opportunities for future research in 
this area. 
Implications  
An important contribution of this study for both managers and public policy makers is 
that regulations, in general, matter. Pharmaceutical manufacturer cannot ignore regulatory 
regimes as they affect the (volume) attractiveness of a country. For instance, drug volumes are 
ceteris paribus higher in countries with manufacturer price regulation, while they are lower in 
countries with direct-to-consumer or prescription budget regulation. These insights may be of 
value to managers when they develop their international launch plans and their expectations 
towards sales growth in the respective markets they enter. In addition, this study confirms that the 
cultural and economic characteristics of countries do also affect their attractiveness for 
pharmaceutical firms. Managers could therefore locate their markets of interest in a map that 
accounts for regulatory, cultural and economic dimensions that would guide strategy planning. 
Our study is also relevant to public policy makers. First, public policy makers are 
interested in international variation in new drug sales, as they may wish to compare drug 
consumption – for health care system quality or cost reasons – in their own country to others.     36
Second, they wish to know the relationship between regulatory restrictions they enforce and drug 
consumption. For instance, some regulatory restrictions have a larger effect on newly launched 
drugs than on maturing drugs, and vice versa. We find sales of maturing drugs to suffer more 
from prescription budget regulation than newly launched drugs. In contrast, the prohibition of 
DTCA depresses sales of newly launched drugs more than it depresses sales of maturing drugs. 
Insights, such as these, provide the regulator with guidelines for the enforcement, monitoring and 
adaptation of the regulatory environment. Obviously, these latter recommendations need to be 
treated with caution, in view of the Lucas critique that may apply to our model (Bronnenberg et 
al. 2005).  
Limitations and Future Research 
Similar to most, if not all, studies on international new product growth, we do not study 
firms’ marketing instruments. Our interest in obtaining insights from a very large set of countries 
that also includes developing countries prohibits the gathering of consistent information on 
pricing or marketing efforts. Because of the lack of marketing-mix information and the 
intermediation of marketing-mix on the effects of regulation on sales, our hypotheses are 
contingent upon marketing-mix effects on sales. The drawback is that our model cannot 
distinguish between demand (e.g. physician prescription budget regulation may depress drug 
demand) and supply effects (e.g. restrictions on marketing efforts may restrict the amount of 
detailing and thereby physician prescriptions). For instance, the mere presence of regulations may 
“force the hand” of managers and lead to more creative, efficient ways of marketing their 
products. While our study makes the first steps in exploring the role of regulation in the 
international sales growth of pharmaceutical drugs, further research that disentangles demand and 
supply aspects would be of great interest to complement our findings. 
In addition, we do not model the effects of the national health infrastructure, such as 
health expenditures, number of doctors, or hospital beds per capita, neither the effect of the 
national health status. Yet, health infrastructure and health status are known to be very much   37
driven by economic wealth of a country (Desiraju et al. 2004), and we therefore expect it to be 
partly captured by the effect of GDP per capita in our model.  
Third, our dependent variable in this study is sales. We do not discern whether high sales 
or low sales are good or bad for society, e.g. in terms of over- or underconsumption of drugs. 
Some have argued that drug usage is too low. For instance, Hassett (2004) illustrates that many 
deaths can be prevented by higher statin intake, not only in more restrictive countries (26,000 
preventable deaths in Italy over 5 years), but even in the most intensive drug market (19,000 
preventable deaths in the United States over 5 years). Others – mostly in Western Europe – have 
argued that drug usage is typically too high. The study of the influence of country characteristics 
on patient welfare, rather than new drug sales, may yield interesting insights.  
Fourth, our sample of countries is likely biased towards more developed health markets, 
as the motivation to cover the market for data intermediaries, such as IMS Health, is larger, while 
the hurdles to do so are smaller. Moreover, independent variables in models such as ours (e.g. the 
inventory of the regulatory environment) are also more likely to be missing for low income 
countries than for developing or developed countries. The sample selection issue should lead to 
some caution towards our results, even though our sample contains more (developing and low-
income) countries than many prior studies in this area. 
Fifth, future research on cross-country spill-over effects would also be valuable. Such 
spill-over effects may occur in: (1) sales – e.g. because physicians affect each other across 
country borders; (2) marketing instruments – e.g. because manufacturers set their marketing 
policy on the pan-regional level, rather than the country level; and (3) regulation – e.g. because 
countries mimic each other in regulatory behavior. 
Overall, there is still much research to be done on international growth patterns of new 
pharmaceutical drugs. Likewise, this study is one of the first endeavors in the role of regulation 
on international new product growth processes. This area is worthy of more academic attention, 
given its importance.   38
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Online Appendix 
This technical appendix provides additional information about: (1) the computation of the 
typical patterns of pricing and marketing efforts in Figures 1 and 2 and (2) additional results on 
our model estimates.  
Computation of the Typical Patterns of Pricing and Marketing 
Efforts 
Let Rj be a dummy variable indicating whether a regulation is applied in a country j, with 
Rj = 1 if a price regulation is enforced in country j, and Rj = 0 otherwise. Following a similar 
framework as Coull et al. (2001), we model icjt price  as follows: 
       ( ) icjt R icjt t f price
j ε + = ,    icjt ε ~  ( )
2 , 0 t N σ .  (A1) 
where  () t f
j R 0 =  and  () t f
j R 1 =  respectively represent the typical pricing pattern in a country where 
a manufacturer price regulation is applied, respectively the typical pricing pattern in a country 
where no price regulation is applied. A linear penalized spline model (see Model Specification 
section for more details) can be written as  





















1 0  (A2) 
with random coefficients  k v ~  ( )
2 , 0 v N σ  and  k w ~  ( )
2 , 0 w N σ . We use a similar framework to 
model the typical pattern of marketing efforts in a country where a regulation that restrict 
marketing efforts to physicians is applied and in a country where it is not the case.   44
Model Estimates 
The following Table A.1. presents all estimates, in full, of the best model, of which we 
presented the core results in Table 4 and Figure 4.  
a) Fixed Effects 






Regulatory variables       
Manufacturer price regulation  0.076 0.010  -  - 
Marketing efforts to physicians regulation  -0.019 0.016  -  - 
Regulation on the physician prescription budgets  0.070 0.017  -0.002 0.001 
Patient co-payment regulation  -0.050 0.037  -  - 
DTCA regulation  -0.209 0.092  -0.006 0.008 
Cultural dimensions       
Uncertainty avoidance  -0.003 0.008  0.000  0.000 
Individualism  0.024 0.016  0.001 0.000 
Masculinity  -0.047 0.006  -  - 
Long-term orientation  -0.018 0.012  -  - 
Economic wealth  0.024 0.007  -  - 
Competition  0.007 0.008  -0.001 0.000 
Lagged sales  2.713 0.026  0.003 0.001 
Introductory lag (IV)  0.059 0.009  -0.006 0.001 









Error Structure  
Regulatory variables     
0 α   1.348 
Manufacturer price regulation  -   
α σ   1.333 
Marketing efforts to physicians regulation  -  
Regulation on the physician prescription budgets  2.052e-07  
γ σ   0.160 
Patient co-payment regulation  -      
DTCA regulation  4.821 e-03       
Cultural dimensions  -      
Uncertainty avoidance  2.409 e-06      
Individualism  4.429 e-06       
Masculinity  -      
Long-term orientation  -      
Economic wealth  -      
Competition   1.596 e-08      
Lagged sales  1.389 e-08      
Introductory lag (IV)   3.469 e-03      
Table A.1: Estimation results of the best time-varying coefficient model 
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